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H
ow should banks and other lenders account for the risk that a borrower will
default on a loan? This accounting determines when and to what extent a
bank recognizes changes in expected credit losses on its income statement
and the value at which loans are reported on the bank’s balance sheet. Should these
amounts differ when the bank’s financial reports are prepared for its shareholders
and for the banking authorities, or should the authorities manage the numbers directly
or indirectly through the capital requirement?
These questions are the source of an ongoing debate among banks and the agen-
cies that regulate them: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and bank supervisors.
1 The FASB is a private-
sector entity delegated by the SEC to set financial accounting standards, called gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Bank supervisors have responsibility
for setting regulatory accounting principles (RAP). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) mandates that RAP generally follow GAAP
but allows exceptions that assist supervisors in performing their duties. However, any
such exception must be “no less stringent than generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples.”
2 Bank supervisors are also granted an unusual role in setting GAAP by Section
241 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which mandates that the SEC “shall con-
sult and coordinate comments” with the appropriate federal bank supervisors before
“taking any action or rendering any opinion with respect to the manner in which any
insured depository institution or depository institution holding company reports loan
loss reserves.” 
Wall and Koch (2000) discuss the philosophy underlying the different positions
of the FASB and the SEC versus that of the bank supervisors. The authors conclude
that the primary users of financial statements, investors and bank supervisors, are
likely to form their own estimates of banks’ loan losses. Thus, the philosophy under-
lying the reported figures may be less important than the transparency of the process
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required by the accounting authorities and by the bank supervisors for their respec-
tive estimates of loan losses. Nevertheless, the debate over appropriate procedures
continues, with Davenport (2004) reporting that the FASB intends to take up the
issue again.
3
This article seeks to answer the question of how the value of loans on a bank’s
balance sheet should be adjusted for expected credit losses. Underlying the analysis
is the assumption that the value most useful to bankers, investors, and bank super-
visors is the economic value of loans as of
the balance-sheet date. This value is the
present (discounted) value of the cash
payments the bank expects to receive from
the borrowers as a group, which is less than
the promised amount, because the bank
cannot perfectly predict which loans will
default. When loans are recorded at their economic values, there should be no reduc-
tion in this amount with an allowance for loan losses because the interest rate
charged should be sufficient to cover expected default losses. Our analysis leads us
to conclude that even when loans are accounted for at historic cost, under most
situations no allowance for loan losses should be made. Loan-loss expense for a period,
then, is the loss incurred on loans that defaulted during the period. However, if cash
flow expectations change so that loans decrease in value, the decrease is an addition
to loan-loss expense. 
Although historic-cost GAAP can provide useful information, economic value
clearly would be superior if measurement of the numbers were reliable and cost
effective. The problem is that the economic values of loans are not readily observable
unless the loans are traded in sufficiently liquid markets. Many loans, though, are not
traded because of information asymmetry between the bank and potential buyers. A
bank’s knowledge of its customers includes strengths and weaknesses that may not
be apparent from documents that describe the lending situation. This basic attribute
of loans results in banks often placing a greater value on a loan than buyers are will-
ing to pay or in buyers discounting loans because they fear the seller may be holding
back important negative information (adverse selection). Consequently, loan values
and the related losses must be estimated. Both accountants and bank supervisors are
concerned about the results of this estimation, but each group has a different per-
spective on the question.
The accounting authorities’ concern is for general-purpose users of financial
statements, particularly investors. Investors may pay too much for bank stocks if
banks’ reported losses are understated, or they may sell their stock too cheaply if the
losses are overstated. Thus, the accounting authorities are worried about biased esti-
mates in either direction, particularly when the bias is intentional. The authorities
recognize that managers, who prepare the financial statements, sometimes have
incentives to use loan-loss accounting to manipulate the numbers reported. In some
situations managers have an incentive to understate expected losses in order to
boost reported net income and capital in the current period. In other situations man-
agers have an incentive to overstate losses in the current report when earnings are
high so that they can understate losses in a later period when other earnings are low,
thereby smoothing the reported net income.
4
In contrast, bank supervisors are concerned about banks being inadequately cap-
italized and possibly failing. Banks should maintain loan-loss allowances sufficient to
cover expected losses and maintain sufficient equity capital to absorb unexpected
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Present accounting principles are largely
based on a system that values assets and
liabilities at their historic cost rather than
at their current market value.losses. Bank supervisors argue that reasonable approaches to estimating loan losses
are likely to yield a range of estimates. Given supervisors’ focus on safety, they want
banks to report a loan-loss allowance that is on the high end of those estimates. 
This article considers these somewhat different approaches to banks’ loan-loss
accounting by reviewing existing GAAP for loan-loss accounting in the following sec-
tion. The next section compares the economic value of a loan with its reported value
under current GAAP. The article then reviews the GAAP “reliability” and “relevance”
criteria and analyzes existing GAAP and proposals to value loans and other financial
assets and liabilities at their “fair values,” particularly with respect to the criteria.
5 We
then analyze bank supervisors’ concerns about loan-loss accounting. The last section
summarizes the results of prior discussion and presents conclusions that are relevant
for policy.
Current Accounting Standards
Existing accounting standards as determined by the FASB are specified in its
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS).
6 The two statements most
relevant to loan-loss accounting are FAS 5, Accounting for Contingencies, and
FAS 114, Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan. FAS 5 (paragraph 8)
sets two standards, both of which must be met in order to recognize a loss contin-
gency in a firm’s financial statement: 
a. Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates that
it is probable that an asset has been impaired. . . at the date of the financial state-
ments. It is implicit in this condition that it must be probable that one or more
future events will occur confirming the fact of the loss.
b. The amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.
FAS 5 defines “probable” as “the event or events are likely to occur” (paragraph 3).
“Probable” is generally interpreted as “more likely than not,” or having at least a
50 percent chance of occurring.
FAS 114 provides additional guidance on accounting for individual loans that
are impaired in terms of both defining impairment and measuring the extent of
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1. These bank supervisors are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
Although state banking agencies also supervise banks they charter, we are not aware of any that
have taken an interest in this issue.
2. Section 121 of FDICIA, codified to 12 U.S. Code 1831n(a). 
3. The FASB’s indication that it would reconsider loan-loss accounting follows the abandonment of a
proposal by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to provide guidance
on the implementation of existing GAAP, according to Davenport (2004). Bank supervisors had
recommended abandonment in a letter to the chairman of the AICPA dated October 6, 2003, avail-
able at <www.bdbonline.net/pdfs/RegulatorsLetter.pdf>.
4. Managers also might want to manipulate expenses generally to reduce income taxes. However,
since 1986 banks may deduct only realized rather than estimated credit losses. See Walter (1991,
especially 24–25) for a discussion of the historic role of taxes in determining loan-loss accounting.
5. The FASB explains that by “fair value” it means “an estimated market exit price, that is an estimate
of the amount that would have been realized if the entity had sold the asset” (1999, paragraph 12).
Fair value includes, but is not limited to, market value because appraisals, models, and present-
value calculations may be used when relevant market values are not available.
6. The texts of FAS may be obtained from the FASB’s Web site, <www.fasb.org/st/>.
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impairment.
7 FAS 114 amends FAS 5 to indicate in paragraph 8 that “a loan is
impaired when, based on current information and events, it is probable that a cred-
itor will be unable to collect all amounts due according to the contractual terms of
the loan agreement.” Several measures of impairment are permitted under FAS 114,
including “the present value of expected
cash flows discounted at the loan’s effec-
tive interest rate, . . . observable market
price, or the fair value of the collateral if
the loan is collateral dependent” (para-
graph 13, emphasis added). FAS 114 spec-
ifies that “the effective interest rate . . . is
based on the original contractual rate,
not the rate specified in the restructuring
agreement” (paragraph 14). This require-
ment drives a wedge between economic and accounting values because restruc-
tured loans usually are riskier than when originally made. Hence, the interest rate
GAAP requires tends to be lower than the market rate applicable to such loans,
thereby overstating the actual (economic) value of the loans. 
The treatment of loans in FAS 5 and FAS 114 does not apply in two special cases.
First, if loans have been securitized and are traded in financial markets, they must be
accounted for according to FAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt
and Equity Securities. FAS 115 requires classification of debt securities into one of
three categories: held to maturity, available for sale, or trading securities. Securities
classified as held to maturity are accounted for using historic cost; securities that
are available for sale and trading securities are carried at their fair values. Contempor-
aneous changes in fair value of trading securities are included in current earnings. For
securities held for sale, these changes are reported in a supplementary statement of
comprehensive income and are included in the income statement only when the changes
are realized (for example, the securities are sold).
The second exception to FAS 5 and FAS 114 is loans hedged by a derivative con-
tract. FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities,
requires that when a derivative is designated as a hedge for a specified asset or liabil-
ity, the fair-value gain or loss on both the derivative and the hedged item should be
recognized. Thus, if a derivative instrument hedges the fair value of a loan, the loan
will be reported at its fair value.
Economic and Accounting Values of Loans
The economic value of a loan (or any asset) is the present value of the expected cash
receipts.
8 A banker’s estimate of the economic value of a loan need not equal the value
the banker would report for the asset from a straightforward application of GAAP.
9
The banker would be expected to use all available information, taking into considera-
tion the cost of obtaining and using the information, to estimate the loan’s economic
value to the bank. However, the banker is allowed to use only a subset of the available
information to report the GAAP value of the loan unless default is probable.
The differences between economic and accounting value may be more precisely
identified and analyzed by expressing economic value in notational form. In the equa-
tions that follow, uppercase letters represent dollar values and information sets, lower-
case letters represent rates and probabilities, and subscripts represent a time period.
The basic equation for calculating the economic value at time 0 of any set of cash
flows over the interval from time 0 to time N is
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The philosophy underlying the reported
figures may be less important than the
transparency of the process required by
the accounting authorities and by the
bank supervisors for their respective
estimates of loan losses.(1)
where EV 0 is the economic value of the loan at time 0; Ct(I0) is the expected cash
received at time t, given the information I available at time 0; and dr is the discount
rate demanded by investors to compensate for the time value of money, any risks
associated with the loan, and the illiquidity of the loan. Equation (1) says that the
economic value of an asset at time 0 is the sum of the expected cash flows given the
information at time 0, discounted at the appropriate interest rate.
The issues in loan-loss accounting may be illustrated by making two changes in
equation (1). First, the expected cash flow at time t may be separated into the
promised cash flow less the expected loan losses due to default on the part of the
borrower. Second, the promised cash flow may be further separated into promised
interest payments and promised principal payments. The economic value of a bullet
(or nonamortizing) loan with these modifications to equation (1) is
10
(2)
where lr is the rate of interest paid on the loan; P is the principal value of the loan;
pdt(I0) is the probability that default will occur at time t, given the information avail-
able at time 0; and LGDt(I0) is the loss given default at time t, conditional on the
information available at time 0.
The first term (inside the square brackets) of equation (2) represents the dis-
counted promised payments on the loan—the discounted value of the promised inter-
est payments on the loan (lrP) plus the discounted value of the promised principal
repayment.
11 The second term is the discounted value of the expected loan losses given
the information at time 0—the probability that the loan will have defaulted at time
t(pdt) multiplied by the expected loss given default at time t(LGDt). Equation (2) may
be simplified without changing our conclusions by assuming that the value of LGD is
constant for every time t and does not change with the arrival of new information.
12
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7. FAS 114 specifically excludes from its scope “large groups of smaller-balance homogenous loans
that are collectively evaluated for impairment” (paragraph 6). Such loans are often called retail
loans and include credit card and automobile loans.
8. The economic value of a loan after it has been made also depends on the bank’s cost of adminis-
tering the loan. We do not include a term for this cost in our analysis because doing so would com-
plicate the notation without providing any additional insight on loan-loss accounting.
9. In this section we will assume that the banker would honestly report her best estimate of a loan’s
value in accordance with GAAP. The following section considers the possibility that other consid-
erations may influence the reported value of a loan in a bank’s financial statements.
10. Equation (2) could be easily modified to analyze an amortizing loan (a loan with periodic principal
prepayments) at the cost of somewhat more complicated notation. However, doing so would not
change our qualitative results.
11. We could allow the discount rate on the loan to vary through time and with the arrival of new infor-
mation, but doing so would not change our qualitative insights on accounting for credit losses. The
issues associated with accounting for time variation in the discount rate are discussed below.
12. We realize that the loss given default could change through time or with changes in information,
such as the appreciation or depreciation in the value of collateral. While such changes would
affect the magnitude of the difference between economic and accounting values, these changes
would not alter our qualitative conclusions.
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The economic value of a loan may change from one period to the next as a direct
consequence of the passage of time.
13 The value may also change because of the arrival
of new information that alters the expected values of the probability of default in
future periods. Thus, the economic value of the loan at the start of the next period,
period 1, is
(3)
The change due merely to the passage of time is reflected in the change in the period
over which the cash flows are summed—from time 0 to time Nin equation (2) and from
time 1 to time N in equation (3). The new information is reflected by updating the
information set used to calculate the probability of default from pdt(I0) in equation
(2) to pdt(I1) in equation (3).
In contrast, accounting values respond to a change in pdt, and hence accord with
economic values, only if a loss is probable, the loan is hedged by a derivative, or the
loan has been securitized and is not categorized as held to maturity. Loans that do
not meet any of these criteria are hereafter called a “typical loan” in recognition that
most loans in banks’ portfolios do not meet these criteria. The GAAP value of a loan
may differ from its economic value for three important reasons, discussed next.
GAAP value cannot exceed the principal value of the loan. The account-
ing, or GAAP, value of a typical loan may differ from its economic value both at the
time the loan is made and in future periods in part because a loan’s maximum GAAP
value is its principal value. In contrast, a loan’s economic value would be expected
to exceed its principal value if the market for loans is less than perfectly competi-
tive. In addition, under GAAP the cost of acquiring the loan and putting it on the
books (the initial cost) is almost never capitalized (added to the face value of the
loan). The loan’s economic value is greater than the face value by the present value
of these amounts, which the bank collects over time as part of the borrower’s inter-
est payments.
GAAP value does not incorporate all new information about pd. In the
periods after a loan is first recorded, the GAAP value may differ from the economic
value because GAAP permits consideration of changes in the probability of default
(pd) only if default is probable. This limit on the recognition of changes in default
probabilities would result in the GAAP value of a loan being less than its economic
value when new information indicates that the probability of default has declined.
However, the GAAP value of a loan could be more than its economic value when new
information indicates an increase in the probability of default (pd) in future periods
but the cumulative probability of default remains below 50 percent (is not probable).
GAAP value generally ignores anticipated changes in pd. A loan’s GAAP
value may also differ from its economic value if the hazard rate—the probability of
default conditional on the loan not defaulting in a prior period—is not constant through
future periods, given the information available at any point in time.
14 A large set of
possible alternative variations exists in the probability of default. One common pat-
tern with important regulatory implications is one in which the probability of default
is very low for several periods after the loan is made and then increases. For exam-
ple, experience might indicate that borrowers tend to maintain their promised pay-
ments for several years, both because the projects for which they borrowed the funds
















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA take time to fail (if they do) and because they can hide the failure for a while by hold-
ing back some of the borrowed funds and then using the funds to meet scheduled
interest and principal payments. Experienced bankers probably recognize this pat-
tern of risk and behavior. The contract rate of interest paid on the loan, lr, though, is
almost never structured to change with expected changes in credit risk during the
life of the loan. Rather, the rate is set to compensate the bank for the net present value
of expected credit losses over the life of the loan.
15 As a result, in this situation the
contract rate of interest will overcompensate for credit risk in some earlier periods
and undercompensate for credit risk in some future periods.
16
Consider the simplest case in which the probability of default increases every
period from initiation to maturity. Then, stated in terms of our notation, for some
periods from the initiation of the loan at 0 through some later point M, the expected
loss due to default is less than its average value over the life of the project (assumed
to be N periods):
(4)
for i ≤ M. Then in subsequent periods 
(5)
for M < j ≤ N.
17 Note that all values of the probability of defaults in equations (4) and (5)
are based on the information set I0. Given that the contract rate on the loan, lr, is set
at time 0 to compensate the firm for the average loss over the period, the implication
is that the bank collects a credit risk premium early in the life of the loan that exceeds
the required compensation for default losses for the first m periods, but in subsequent
periods the credit risk premium will be less than the required compensation.
Although predictable time variation in pd drives a wedge between earnings
reported on a GAAP basis and earnings based on economic values for individual
loans, the wedge often will not be material at the level of portfolios of similar loans.
Portfolios often contain loans of varying maturities with the overstatement of earn-
ings on relatively recent loans being more or less offset by understatement on older
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13. An exception for which the economic value of the loan does not change arises if the probability
of default is constant, the discount rate is constant, and the market for loans is competitive.
14. The interest paid on a loan in any given period compensates for its expected losses in that period—
the hazard rate times the expected loss given default.
15. This analysis would not hold if lr varied in response to changes in the borrower’s credit quality.
However, most variable-rate loans do not adjust to changes in the borrower’s credit quality but
rather in response to changes in a market rate, such as the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).
The primary reason for movement in these market rates is changes in the default-free risk rate.
Risk-related movements in that rate are the result of changes in overall credit risk and not to the
risk of a specific borrower or loan.
16. This situation is similar to a level payment on a whole-life insurance policy, where the early-period
payments exceed the expected death payout in those periods. 
17. This formulation assumes that the probability of default is increasing over the entire life of the
loan. While we could model more complicated time patterns, doing so would complicate the analy-
sis without adding any important new insights.
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maturity between origination and maturity, the difference between GAAP earnings
and earnings based on economic value would be about zero. Thus, predictable time
variation in pd is unlikely to have a material effect on the difference in earnings
unless the size of the loan portfolio is significantly increasing or decreasing. 
Summary of economic and accounting treatment. The differences between
GAAP values and economic values are summarized in Table 1. GAAP requires the
reporting of the principal value of the loan in all cases except where default is prob-
able, as shown in panel B. For example, even if new information suggests that the
cumulative probability of default over the remainder of a loan’s life increased from 1
percent to 49 percent, GAAP would not allow any recognition of the greatly increased
probability of default. In contrast, the economic value of the loan at its initiation is
likely to be greater than the principal of the loan, as shown in panel A. Thereafter,
the economic value of the loan will respond to changes in the discounted value of the
promised payment less the discounted value of the expected loan losses, as shown
in panel B. Thus, unlike GAAP reported values, the economic value of a loan would
decrease in response to new information, suggesting the probability of default had
increased from 1 percent to 49 percent.
The differences between the definition of GAAP and economic values for indi-
vidual loans imply that the two values respond differently to new information and the
passage of time if default is not probable, as summarized in Table 2. The GAAP value
remains at the principal value of the loan. In panel B, the arrival of new information
about the probability of default results in economic value moving inversely with the
change in the probability of default. 
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the changes in economic value if the probability
of default increases throughout the life of the loan. Absent any news after initia-
tion, the loan’s value declines as time proceeds when the probability of default in the
period is less than its per-period average probability. Assuming the loan does not
default, its value increases later in its life when the average probability of default is
above its per-period average amount. Note that panel C gives changes in the eco-
nomic value of an individual loan and not a portfolio of loans. If a bank’s portfolio
includes individual loans of approximately equal amounts and maturities, the prob-
abilities of default in any one period tend to average out and be approximately
equal among periods. 
One overall implication that may be taken from this analysis is that the reported
GAAP value is likely to understate the economic value of most banks’ portfolios most
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Table 1 
Comparison of GAAP and Economic Values
Situation GAAP value Economic value
A: Value at loan initiation
Competitive market for individual loans Loan principal Loan principal plus the costs
of making the loan
Lender has market power Loan principal Greater than the loan principal
B: Reported loan value after initiation
Default is not probable Loan principal Economic value
Default is probable Economic value Economic valueof the time. Consider a loan portfolio consisting of the same amount of loans at every
possible maturity and the same probability of default on every loan. If the realized prob-
ability of default is equal to the portfolio’s expected value, the portfolio should be worth
more than its principal value because the initial costs of making and booking loans are
not capitalized. If the bank can charge a higher-than-competitive interest rate, perhaps
because it has market power, the portfolio would be worth even more. The decline in
the value of loans when default becomes more likely would be offset by the increase
in the value of loans when default becomes less likely. However, GAAP accounting
allows recognition of decreases in the value of loans only in cases in which default is
probable and does not recognize increases in loan value. Thus, GAAP accounting
requires the bank to report its loans at less than their economic value or their principal
value even when overall defaults in the portfolio exactly match the bank’s expectations.
Analysis of Present and Proposed Accounting Rules
Present accounting principles are largely based on a system that values assets and
liabilities at their historic cost rather than at their current market value. Historic-cost
accounting reflects an emphasis on providing reliable financial information even if the
information is not the most relevant to the problem facing the decision maker. The
FASB’s move toward use of fair-value accounting, particularly for financial instruments,
reflects its belief that fair values could and would be measured sufficiently reliably by
managers and be audited effectively by independent public accountants and, conse-
quently, would provide more relevant information to decision makers. This section
begins by discussing the concepts of “relevance” and “reliability” as expressed by the
FASB and then shows how present GAAP has systematically selected options that have
greater reliability at the cost of decreased relevance. The next subsection considers
the issues raised by the FASB’s proposed move to fair-value accounting.
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Table 2
Comparison of Changes in GAAP and Economic Values
1
Change in Change in
Situation GAAP value economic value
A: No new information, probability of default is equal in every remaining period 
No new information, probability of default No change No change
is equal in every remaining period 
B: New information, per-period probability of default is constant over the remaining life of the loan
New information suggests an increase  No change Economic value decreases
in the probability of default
New information suggests a decrease No change Economic value increases
in the probability of default
C: No new information, per-period probability of default is increasing over the remaining life of the loan
Probability of default is less than  No change Economic value decreases 
average probability of default
Probability of default is greater than  No change Economic value increases
average probability of default 
1 Comparison of changes in GAAP and economic values assumes that the economic value equals the loan value at initiation, the loan principal
is due at maturity, and default is not probable.28 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
Concepts of reliability and relevance. The FASB has published seven state-
ments on Financial Accounting Concepts (FAC) that explain the concepts it seeks to
implement in providing guidance on specific accounting issues. In FAC 2, the FASB
explains how it evaluates alternative accounting choices: “The better choice is the
one that . . . produces from among the available alternatives information that is most
useful for decision making” (1980, paragraph 30).
18 Paragraph 15 explains that “the
qualities that distinguish ‘better’ (more useful) information from ‘inferior’ (less use-
ful) information are primarily the qualities
of relevance and reliability” (emphasis in
original). Paragraphs 60 and 61 employ an
analogy to medical drugs to distinguish the
two qualities. A drug is reliable if the con-
tents of the bottle conform to the formula
shown on the label. A drug is relevant if it is effective, that is, if it cures or alleviates
the underlying condition. The analogy, though, is incomplete. In many instances the
choice is between a reliable drug of limited curative value (historic cost) and a drug
that might be effective if it were reliable (fair value based on actual market values) but
would most likely be harmful if it were believed to be reliable but actually was unre-
liable (fair value based on management’s subjective estimates). The problem is that
financial statements are the responsibility of a firm’s management, who provide the
estimates of market values.
19 Although managers sometimes have an incentive to under-
estimate economic values, more typically they may be expected to overestimate these
values because their performance evaluations and compensation often are heavily
influenced by reported values. 
Present GAAP rules. GAAP often encompasses a trade-off between reliability
and relevance, using values based on historic costs to measure some items and economic
values to measure others. Contemporary loan-loss accounting reflects such a mix,
with loans recorded at historic cost but with the loan-loss allowance based on esti-
mated market values under certain conditions. Both the use of historic cost to record
loans (excluding the initial cost) and the conditions placed on the use of market values
serve to increase the reliability of the financial statements. 
The analysis of the economic values presented here indicates that a loan should
be expected to have a positive economic value to the bank at the time the loan is
made whenever the relevant market is not perfectly competitive. Even when the
market is perfectly competitive, the loan’s value to the bank is greater than the
amount the borrower receives because the interest payments include amounts that
compensate the bank for its operating costs and return on capital. However, current
accounting principles require that the loan be recorded at the amount loaned to the
borrower, with initial operating costs (for example, acquisition, credit check, and
administration) charged off as current-period expenses. Although the loan amount is
a historical number that tends to understate the loan’s economic value to the bank,
it has the advantage of having been measured reliably and inexpensively. In contrast,
the loan’s economic value when it is initiated is an estimate that must be made by the
preparer of the financial statements—the bank’s management. 
If loans were not recorded at historic cost, a bank could increase its reported net
income merely by making additional loans near the close of the accounting period and
recognizing its management’s expectations of the discounted profits from the new
loans as additional loan value and current-period income. Not only might such profits
never be realized, but also such an accounting procedure would create an incentive
for some managers to book new loans solely to record estimated and overoptimistic
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Recognizing larger expected loan losses in
financial statements does not give banks
added resources to absorb losses.profits. This situation is more likely to occur when managerial bonuses depend on
recorded profits or when managers want to offset losses that must be recognized.
20
As described earlier, loan-loss accounting requires recognition of estimated losses
in certain circumstances, particularly when a loss is probable (FAS 5). This require-
ment should discourage (but probably does not prevent) banks and other lenders
from adjusting their estimates of expected losses as a tool for smoothing net income.
21
Absent this rule, given a sufficiently large portfolio of loans, a bank could materially
reduce and later increase reported net income by making changes in expected prob-
abilities of default or loss-given-default of a magnitude that would be difficult, if not
impossible, for any outside party to disprove or even verify. Although the requirement
that a loss be probable still requires the use of an estimate, it limits the application
to those loans that are or soon will clearly be in distress. Moreover, the common prac-
tice of banks working with distressed borrowers further reduces the opportunity for
a banker to assert incorrectly that a loss is probable on a loan with elevated risk. As a
part of the loan workout, the bank often will relax terms that the borrower may have
difficulty meeting. For example, the bank may lower interest payments but require
additional collateral. These changes reduce the expected loss to the bank and thus
tend to reduce the probability of default to less than probable, thereby obviating the
loan’s being written off or down.
Another FAS 5 requirement increases the reliability of reported losses. FAS 5
maintains that the probability of a loss must be based on information that is known or
knowable as of the financial statement date. Although reliability is not the primary rea-
son for these requirements, they increase reliability by requiring that losses be based
solely on past events and not in anticipation of future events.
22 However, because an
asset’s economic value is based on all available information (including the present value
of future events that have a non-negligible but less than 50 percent probability of occur-
ring), as described earlier, this GAAP rule tends to overstate some loan values.
When a bank expects that default losses in a portfolio of loans are not constant
over time but will, say, increase, to be consistent with GAAP, a bank should recognize
that the early-period loan interest payments include compensation for expected future
losses. To account for this situation, a bank should record that portion as a deferred
credit in the liability section of the balance sheet, with an offsetting reduction of loan-
interest revenue. When the higher loan loss is incurred as expected, the accounting
entry would reduce (debit) this deferred credit. But this accounting is almost never
done because it involves difficult-to-make estimates and cumbersome bookkeeping
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18. The decisions are presumably made by “present and potential investors and creditors and other
users making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions” (FAC 2 1980, paragraph 22).
19. Although independent public accountants review management’s estimates, their role is not to
provide substitute estimates but rather to verify that management’s estimates were derived by
the consistent application of generally accepted procedures and that the numbers presented con-
form to GAAP.
20. This situation occurred when Enron adopted fair-value accounting for a substantial portion of its
activities, as shown in Benston (2005). Overvaluation to obtain bonuses is also given by the FDIC
(2000) as an example of the accounting abuses at Pacific Thrift and Loan Company.
21. Note that if banks’ use of the allowance for loan losses were substantially eliminated, as our anal-
ysis leads us to suggest, this form of income smoothing would be obviated.
22. The primary reason for this requirement in FAS 5 is that GAAP is concerned with the measure-
ment of periodic net income. The intent is that current income should reflect only those events
that occurred during or before the reporting period and that expenses incurred to earn the
income should be reported (matched) in the same period.
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entries. Furthermore, when loan portfolios are stable, the credits and debits tend to
wash out because overstatements of current-period loan-loss expense approximately
equal overstatements of current-period interest-income revenue.
Fair-value accounting. The FASB’s interest in implementing fair-value account-
ing for financial instruments dates back at least to 1991, with FAS 107, Disclosures
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments. FAS 115, Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities (enacted in 1993), requires the inclusion
of fair values in the balance sheet and income statement (rather than only disclosure
in footnotes) for securities not held to maturity for which reliable market prices could
be determined by reference to securities regularly traded on recognized securities
exchanges. FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activity
(enacted in 1998), expresses the FASB view forcefully: “Fair value is the most rele-
vant measure for financial instruments and the only relevant measure for derivative
instruments” (emphasis in original).
23 The primary benefit of fair-value accounting,
according to the FASB, is discussed in its Preliminary Views:
The major conceptual advantage of fair value as a measurement attribute is that
because it is a market-based notion, it is unaffected by:
a. The history of the asset or liability. Fair value does not depend on the date or
cost at which an asset or liability is acquired or incurred.
b. The specific entity that holds the asset or owns the liability. Fair value is the
same no matter which entity has an asset or liability if both entities have access
to the same markets and, for a liability, if they have the same credit standing.
c. The future of the asset or liability. That is, fair value does not depend on the
intended disposition of an asset or liability. (1999, paragraph 3)
Thus, fair values are measured as values in exchange, the amounts for which an asset
can be sold or a liability extinguished. These exit values necessarily understate the
values to investors in companies that do not expect to dispose of their assets. For
these “going concerns,” the value of assets is their value in use, that is, their present
values. If assets could be sold for more than their value in use (including additional
value from related business and net of transactions costs), they should and usually
would be sold. Hence, assets that are kept would almost always have greater values
in use than in exchange, and fair values understate the economic value of those assets
to the owners of an enterprise.
Application of fair values to loan-loss accounting. If loans could be reported
reliably at fair value, where fair value is value in use, there would be no need for a
loan-loss provision or allowance. The fair value of the loan portfolio would be reported
as an asset, and the change in the fair value of the portfolio, positive or negative,
would be recognized on the income statement. The problem with applying fair value
is that no market exists for many loans because banks obtain information about bor-
rowers’ credit quality that cannot be credibly conveyed to potential buyers of the
loan. As a consequence, potential loan buyers are concerned about adverse selection,
which here means the possibility that the seller is selling a particular loan because
the seller has adverse private information about the loan. The result is that the mar-
ket for selling some types of loans either breaks down or exists only because the
seller retains part of the credit risk. A market for the full transfer of credit risk does
not exist because banks place a greater value on the loan than potential buyers are
willing to pay. 
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exists for low-risk standardized loans, such as the market for mortgage loans. The con-
tracts between mortgage originators and securitizers impose penalties on the origi-
nators if the credit losses exceed some specified minimum amount (Frame 2003).
Consequently, a bank may choose to hold rather than securitize such loans. Since
loans that are securitized are reduced by a discount reflecting investors’ concerns about
adverse selection, application of those prices to value loans that are retained understates
their value to the firm because such loans are not subject to this concern.
Fair values of loans held by a bank could be approximated, however, by taking
account of changes in such observable variables as changes in market rates of interest
that apply to loans of a given kind. For example, if the interest rate on conventional
mortgage loans with similar terms (such as down payment and maturity) changed, loan
values could be determined by discounting the expected cash flows by the current
interest rate. (See the sidebar on page 32 for additional discussion of this issue.)
Analysis of Bank Supervisors’ Position
The comparison of economic value and reported accounting values in the second sec-
tion suggests that adherence to existing accounting principles will result in reported
values that are generally less than the loans’ economic value (with some important
exceptions).
24 Thus, even though loan losses reported in accordance with GAAP reflect
only probable losses, net loan values on average will be conservative, as desired by
the bank supervisors. Nevertheless, bank supervisors continue to press the case for
even more conservative valuations.
25 Are the supervisors seeking valuations that are
excessively conservative?
Even though reported loan valuations are conservative on average, they are not
conservative in all cases. As we mentioned earlier, one important exception can occur
when the expected probability of default (pd) is low in the first few periods after
the loan is made but increases substantially over time. A portfolio of these loans
will appear very profitable in the early years and only later will reflect large losses.
Consequently, financial statements based on current GAAP could materially over-
state profits and loan values if these types of loans are a large and rapidly growing
part of a bank’s asset portfolio, assuming that these overstatements are not offset
by the GAAP understatement of economic values when loans are initially recorded.
Supervisors may reasonably be concerned that allowing a bank to expand its loan
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23. The expression of an interest in fair-value accounting in FAS 133 is not surprising, given the dif-
ficulty in a hybrid historic-cost and fair-value environment to fairly present the financial position
of a firm that uses derivative contracts to hedge. The problem is determining how to account for
positions when an instrument valued at fair value is hedging a financial position valued at historic
cost. A substantial portion of FAS 133 is devoted to methods of reconciling the two valuations.
The problem of fairly presenting a firm’s position is eliminated, at least conceptually, if both the
position and the hedge were recorded at their fair values.
24. We discuss the exception of nonconstant probability of default next. Changes in the market dis-
count rate could also result in changes in economic values that are not recognized in accounting net
income. However, the effect of GAAP’s not recognizing the effect of unexpected changes in market
interest rates on the values of fixed–interest rate loans affects many assets and liabilities and is not
directly related to loan-loss accounting. We discuss this situation in the sidebar on page 32.
25. Bank supervisors have acknowledged existing GAAP, which mandates recording a loss only when
it is probable, as the basis for regulatory accounting. However, they argue that the existing rules
provide room for recognizing the inherent imprecision in loan-loss estimates, and they would prefer
a bias towards overstating the allowance for loan loss (see AICPA 2003).
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L
oan-loss accounting recognizes that some
borrowers will not fully honor the promised
interest and principal payments. However, loan-
loss accounting does not and is not intended to
recognize changes in loan value due to interest
rates. Thus, the question arises as to whether
banks should recognize changes in the fair value
of loans due to interest rate changes.
The biggest obstacle to fair-value account-
ing for loan losses is that of estimating cash
flows. The bank has valuable information about
future cash flows from most types of loans that
cannot be readily verified by third parties. In
contrast, the most important determinant of
fair value for interest rate changes—changes in
market interest rates—are routinely collected
by several parties, including the Federal Reserve,
and these data are widely available.
Although fair-value accounting to adjust
asset values for interest rate changes does not
face the same fundamental problem as loan-loss
accounting, fair value for rate changes is not
problem-free. One problem is that if this
accounting were limited to financial assets, it
would likely be misleading because banks may
use both liabilities and derivative contracts to
hedge interest rate exposures, such as funding
long-term, fixed-rate loans with long-term,
fixed-rate deposits. Requiring a bank to mea-
sure assets but not liabilities by adjusting for
changes in interest rates would typically be less
informative about the bank’s financial condition
than merely reporting assets and liabilities at
historic cost. Moreover, many banks measure
and hedge their interest rate exposure at the
level of portfolios of financial claims or even at
the bankwide level. Thus, fair-value accounting
should apply the effect of rate changes to all
interest rate–sensitive instruments in a bank’s
portfolio. Although doing so adds complexity, it
does not raise insurmountable or even difficult
conceptual problems for developing reliable
fair-value measures.
More difficult problems with applying fair-
value accounting for interest rate changes arise
from estimating concurrent, related changes in
the cash flows. Cash flows may change when
many financial contracts offer options to one or
both parties, where the value of the option
depends in part on interest rate changes. For
example, residential mortgage loan contracts
often give the borrower the option to prepay
the loan at no extra charge, an option that
increases in value as interest rates decline.
Another way in which cash flows may change is
that banks may administer the rates charged on
certain loans and paid on certain liabilities
rather than allow the rates to change automati-
cally in response to changes in market rates.
An example of such a loan contract is a small-
business loan for which the rate varies with
changes in a bank-determined prime rate. We
next discuss these two cases.
Options Whose Value Depends 
in Part on Interest Rates
A bank’s portfolio may contain both stand-alone
options contracts and a variety of other types of
financial contracts that embed options whose
value depends in part on interest rates. The value
of most stand-alone options can be reasonably
reliably measured without any conceptual
problems because market prices exist for many
types of interest rate options contracts. Some
contracts, such as options on Treasury securi-
ties, trade on exchanges while others, such as
options on interest rate swaps, trade in over-
the-counter markets where price quotes are
frequently available. Moreover, even where mar-
ket prices are unavailable, values can be calcu-
lated using models that depend solely on readily
observable data.
1
The more difficult options-related problem is
that of options embedded in other contracts,
such as loans that allow the borrower to prepay
part or all of the loan principal at no charge.
While the value of these options is largely deter-
mined by interest rates, interest rates are not the
sole determinant of when the options are exer-
cised. The holders of the options may rationally
exercise (or fail to exercise) the options for
reasons that are unrelated to interest rates. For
example, mortgage borrowers may fail to exer-
cise their option to prepay a mortgage loan and
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refinance it with lower-cost debt because their
credit quality has declined to the point where
they cannot obtain another loan. Additionally,
some borrowers, especially consumers, may fail
to exercise options because, considering the cost
of evaluating the situation and the transactions
costs of refinancing, the perceived gain is simply
too small to matter. 
If an embedded interest rate option is a sig-
nificant part of a financial instrument’s value,
market participants may be expected to develop
sophisticated quantitative models to value the
options. The values obtained from these models
could be supplemented by judgmental adjust-
ments based on factors outside the model.
However, the starting point in estimating value
will almost always come from a quantitative
model, given the complexity of valuing interest
rate options. The valuations obtained from these
quantitative models could be used to provide
reliable estimates of embedded options’ value for
financial accounting. 
One potential problem with relying on
model estimates is that from time to time man-
agers will want to adopt a new model that they
perceive is more accurate. If management could
change models every period without disclosing
the change, the reliability of the valuations
could be compromised. However, informative
disclosures about the changes in the models are
possible precisely because the estimates come
from quantitative models. The bank could be
required to disclose that the model used to pre-
pare the financial statements has changed, what
values would have been reported under the prior
model, the monetary effect of the changes, and
the rationale for the change if it has a material
impact on loan values.
Administered Rates
The rate paid on a substantial fraction of bank
loans and deposits varies through time, with
the rate determined by the bank and not
directly by financial markets. The primary
examples are loans to consumers and small
businesses based on the prime rate, such as a
rate of prime plus 1 percent. A bank may base
its prime rate on the published industry aver-
age, but in many cases the bank’s prime rate is
whatever the bank says it is. Similarly, the
bank sets the rate it will pay on deposits held
in the form of negotiable-orders-of-withdrawal
accounts (interest-bearing checking accounts)
and money market deposit accounts. The
bank may set these rates at whatever level it
deems appropriate. 
One way of valuing these accounts is to
estimate expected future interest rates and
take account of the potential gain to the bank
from its administration of the rate charged on
loans and paid on deposits. However, deposit
and loan accounts with such floating-rate fea-
tures typically also provide the bank’s cus-
tomers with the option of withdrawing their
deposits or repaying their loan at par. Thus, at
any given time the par value of the loan or
deposit reflects an implicit market transaction,
wherein the bank sets the rate at a level it
finds acceptable and customers indicate their
willingness to accept the rate by maintaining
the deposit or loan relationship. Moreover, this
continual implicit recontracting suggests that
the bank earns economic rents not as a result
of the bank’s and customers’ initial decisions
to enter into the contracts or as a result of
likely future rate changes. Rather, the bank
earns its rents in each period as customers
maintain their loans or deposits with the bank
even though the difference between the bank’s
administered rate and market rates on compa-
rable instruments may have moved in ways
that are favorable to the bank. This analysis
suggests that loans and deposits with adminis-
tered rates should be valued at par, with any
gains or losses due to rate changes recognized
as they are realized.
1. Models to value interest rate options are not free from error, but their consistent application can yield valuations
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portfolio without recognizing the likely increase in loan losses in future periods
could result in an overstatement of the bank’s current reported profitability and of
the value of equity (retained earnings). If banks are allowed to recognize interest
intended to cover future loan losses as current income, the bank can experience
greater growth while remaining within the supervisor’s capital adequacy stan-
dards, and the book value of equity will
overstate the amount of equity available
to absorb losses that may emerge in the
loan portfolio.
Supervisors may also be concerned
about the GAAP limitation of information
that can be used to determine the proba-
bility and amount of default. FAS 5 specifies that a loss expense may be recorded
only if it is “probable that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact
of the loss” (paragraph 8b, emphasis added). Losses that result from a possible (less
likely than not) change in macroeconomic conditions from expansion to recession
are not accounted for. GAAP does not take account of that risk. 
Thus, bank supervisors have some legitimate concerns that should be addressed.
To the extent that their goal is merely to make loan-loss accounting more conserva-
tive, however, the supervisors’ use of loan-loss accounting is inappropriate and, from
a bank-safety perspective, ineffective. How a bank accounts for loan losses does not
change the cash flow it receives from loans, which is determined by borrowers’ pay-
ments. Recognizing larger expected loan losses in financial statements does not give
banks added resources to absorb losses. The loan-loss provision and allowance are
merely entries in financial statements. If bank supervisors want more capital relative
to assets, they should require it.
If loan-loss accounting is to influence the viability of a bank, it must be through
its influence on the bank’s investment, funding, and dividend policies. Higher reported
loan losses will indeed reduce a bank’s reported earnings and equity capital. This
reduction may induce a bank to undertake some combination of issuing new equity
capital, reducing its dividends, and reducing the growth rate of its risky assets—con-
servative actions that it otherwise might not undertake. Each of these measures will
reduce the probability that a bank will become insolvent. But it is the changes in divi-
dends, equity issuance, or investment policies, and not the change in reported loan
losses, that reduce the risk of insolvency.
Nevertheless, if supervisors believed that loan-loss accounting were a more effi-
cient method of obtaining their supervisory goals, they could replace GAAP with the
more stringent RAP accounting for loan losses. However, this substitution would be
a poor way to deal with this problem because the difference between RAP and GAAP
could create confusion for investors. Furthermore, the problem could be dealt with
more effectively by adjusting bank capital requirements. Bank supervisors could
require risky banks to increase their equity (by reducing dividends or issuing capital)
and demand a reduction in the growth rate of risky assets through capital adequacy
requirements. Thus, the principal safety and soundness benefits that the supervisors
might derive indirectly from higher GAAP loan-loss allowances could be obtained
directly with their existing powers.
26
Bank supervisors and others might object that, absent an allowance for loan losses
and a provision for estimated loan-loss expense, relatively more and less risky loans
will appear to be the same on the balance sheet. But this outcome merely reflects
economic reality, as the following example illustrates. 
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A market for the full transfer of credit risk
does not exist because banks place a greater
value on the loan than potential buyers are
willing to pay.Consider two investments that a bank might make—a $100,000 risk-free gov-
ernment bond or a $100,000 risky loan, each of which matures in five years. Each
promises quarterly interest payments, with the principal repaid at maturity. The
interest rates on the bond and the loan are 4 percent and 12 percent, respectively.
(For purposes of this illustration, assume that the return on capital is included in
operating expenses, no income taxes exist, and no operating expenses are required for
the bond investment.) On the loan, 5 percent of the yield is compensation to the bank
for operating expenses. Thus, the bank gets an additional 3 percent over the bond rate
and operating expenses to compensate it for expected losses given default (assuming
the market is perfectly competitive, the bank is risk neutral, and no associated addi-
tional benefits or costs exist). Through years one, two, and three the loan does not
default and the expectation that the borrower might default does not change. 
Hence, in each of these years, if the bank invested in the government bond, it
would record $4,000 as interest income. For the loan, it would record interest income
of $12,000 less $5,000 of operating expenses, or a net of $7,000, in each year. At the
end of the first three years, the bond and the loan have the same economic and
accounting value—$100,000. But in the middle of year four the borrower declares
bankruptcy and the loan defaults, and the bank can recover, say, only $40,000 after
collection costs. If it had invested in the government bond, it would have recorded in
that year and the following year $4,000 as interest income. But, because it invested
in the loan, in year four it records $6,000 as interest income, $2,500 in operating
expenses (for a half year), and $60,000 in net loan losses, or a reduction in net income
of $56,500. Thus, the two net income streams from these assets are very different.
The government bond earns $4,000 a year over the five years. The annual earnings
(losses) from the loan are $7,000, $7,000, $7,000, $(56,500), and $0 for the loan.
However, assuming the bank collects on the loan at the start of year five, it will have
$40,000 in the last year with which it can invest in an interest-earning asset, reduce
its liabilities, or both.
A bank supervisor’s position might be that the bank should have increased its
allowance for loan losses for the possible loss by reducing its interest income by, say,
$3,000 a year and putting this amount into a contra-asset account (allowance for loan
losses). A securities regulator might say that this accounting procedure would warn
readers of the bank’s financial statement that the loan might default. And when
default did occur, the accounting would soften the blow in year four by $10,500, the
accumulated amount in the allowance for loan losses through mid–year four. This
procedure would be bad accounting, however, because it would misrepresent objec-
tively determined economic reality and would be a very poor way to warn financial
statement readers of the loan risk. First, the economic value of the risky loan and
riskless bond are equal at the end of the first, second, and third years.
27 This situation
exists because the risky loan promises a higher return (risk premium) that compen-
sates the bank for the additional possible (expected) cost of default. If the loan does
not default in a particular period, then the bank has earned the risk premium for that
period. Second, should the loan default, the bank suffers the loss at that time, not
earlier. Third, the variability of the loan’s income stream is a reality that should not
be hidden, but its variance can be reduced if the bank holds a portfolio of loans such
that about the same percentage defaults in any one year.
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26. See Wall and Koch (2000) for a further discussion of this issue.
27. The value of the risky loan remains at par as the credit risk premium earned in each year exactly
equals the required premium to cover the possibility that the loan would default in that year.
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Synthesis and Policy Conclusions
Useful financial information is both relevant and reliable, and these qualities are
interrelated. We have previously shown that GAAP based on historical data, which
initially are derived from market transactions, emphasizes the reliability of reported
data. Economic-value estimates, by contrast, could be more relevant for investment
and supervisory decisions, but only if the
valuations can be trusted, since the esti-
mates are subject to managerial discretion
and manipulation. 
The FASB has begun a process that
may lead to loans being carried on banks’
books at their fair, or estimated market,
value, which would incorporate all available public information about a loan’s value to
a bank. This change could produce more relevant loan valuations if these valuations
can be validated by independent public accountants. The problem is that estimates
of market value by management are required because most types of bank loans either
do not trade in liquid markets or trade only to the extent the seller (explicitly or
implicitly) retains a substantial part of the credit risk. However, such estimates may
not be reliable, given the many incentives management may have to adjust loan val-
uations so that the bank can attain its target equity capital and earnings. Hence, the
FASB’s move toward replacing historical costs with fair values is likely to result in
banks (and other lenders) reporting untrustworthy numbers that also fall short of the
desired value-in-use numbers.
Bank supervisors are important users of financial statements. Unlike investors,
though, they have an asymmetric loss function: Overstated loan values may increase
the probability of a bank’s failing and increase the loss to the FDIC in the event of fail-
ures, but understated loan values impose no cost to supervisors. Thus, supervisors
would prefer that loans be valued at the lower end of the range of reasonable estimates
calculated using all available information (net of costs). However, supervisors do have
other mechanisms that may be used to reduce the probability of a bank failure due to
loan losses, such as requiring banks to hold sufficient capital to absorb those losses.
Our analysis of present GAAP, the proposed moves to fair-value accounting, and
supervisors’ preferred approach reveals significant weaknesses in loan valuation and
accounting. However, such accounting difficulties are not unique to loans. Indeed,
the economic value to an enterprise of many assets, such as buildings, equipment,
and intangibles, rarely can be reliably measured. The approach that has been taken
in accounting is to base financial statements on numbers that can be reliably mea-
sured without creating an opportunity for the reporting firm’s management to overstate
earnings. One important qualification is that economic values not based on verifiable
actual market transactions do not replace historic costs unless the economic values
are lower. This approach limits management’s opportunities to report inflated values for
their firm’s earnings and assets but also provides for disclosure of the more relevant fair
values when economic value has declined.
28
We conclude that using the lower of historic cost or economic value for valuing
the credit risk of loans is the most appropriate procedure for both investors and bank
supervisors. In most cases this approach would result in values similar to those cur-
rently required by GAAP. However, using economic value for loans when these are
less than historic cost would change the criteria for recognizing loan losses in several
important ways. First, this procedure would require use of the full range of increases
in the probability of default, even when a loss is still less than probable. Second, the
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If loan-loss accounting is to influence the
viability of a bank, it must be through its
influence on the bank’s investment, funding,
and dividend policies.procedure would also recognize that reported income might be overstated for rapidly
growing loan portfolios for which the hazard rate is expected to increase rather than
remain constant over time. Although the traditional GAAP matching concept requires
deferral of a portion of interest income during those periods when expected proba-
bilities of default are low until the periods in which the probabilities of default are
expected to increase, this deferral rarely is made (perhaps because this economic
property of loans has not been recognized or has been neglected).
While the application of the lower of historic cost or economic value to loans
would prevent managers from accelerating the reporting of uncertain future earnings
to the current period, it could provide them with a tool for deferring current income
to future periods. Managers who sought to defer income, perhaps to smooth reported
income, could adjust downward their estimates of individual loans’ fair value to reduce
current income. The underestimate of individual loan values could then be reversed
in a subsequent period when the manager sought to report higher income. One mech-
anism for reducing managers’ ability to manipulate reported net income would be to
apply the lower-of-cost-or-economic-value rule to portfolios of similar loans rather
than to individual loans. If this rule were applied at the portfolio level, the manager
would have to make the case that the economic value of the entire portfolio was
below its historic-cost value, a more difficult task to the extent that new loans have
a positive net present value and some loans have appreciated in value as a result of
lower expected future losses. Furthermore, applying the lower-of-cost-or-economic-
value rule to a portfolio of related loans rather than to the entire loan portfolio is
appropriate because banks report disaggregated results by portfolios of similar loans.
Because applying this rule to loan portfolios is likely to understate (and certainly
does not overstate) loan amounts, bank supervisors should be pleased.
Valuation of loan portfolios net of loan losses using a lower-of-historic-cost-or-
economic-value rule would provide the most relevant adequately reliable measure of
loan value. Unlike current GAAP, this rule does not require a reduction in loan port-
folios’ value when their value is already understated by historic cost. Unlike fair
value, our recommended valuation method is less reliant on prices or estimates that
are likely to be systematically biased. Finally, unlike the bank supervisors’ preferred
position, our rule would lead to loans that are less understated and would provide
procedures that are less likely to be abused to facilitate earnings management.
Supervisors may object that higher loan-loss allowances provide a valuable cushion
to absorb unexpected losses and reduce the probability of bank failure. If they believe
that banks would be undercapitalized without loan-loss reserves, supervisors have
other tools to force banks to hold more capital. Indeed, capital serves to protect cred-
itors (particularly depositors and the FDIC) from all sorts of losses, including losses
on securities, real estate, derivatives, foreign exchange, and operations. Loan-loss
accounting, therefore, should return to its original function (providing useful infor-
mation to investors) and not be unnecessarily distorted to accomplish other goals.
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28. The FASB’s move towards requiring fair-value accounting based on estimates, appraisals, and
pricing models, if adopted, would alter the traditional approach.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 38 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). 2003. In Re: Proposed statement of position—
allowance for credit losses (SOP), October 6. <www.
aicpa.org/download/acctstd/cmtltr_recd/clsl/cl279.pdf>
(December 2, 2005).
Benston, George J. 2005. Fair-value accounting: A cau-
tionary tale from Enron. Emory University, Goizueta
Business School, unpublished paper, March.
Davenport, Todd. 2004. A switch to FASB keeps loan-
loss issue on track. American Banker 169, no. 125:
1, 4, 8.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Office
of Inspector General. 2000. Material loss review—
the failure of Pacific Thrift and Loan Company,
Woodland Hills, California. Audit Report No. 00-022,
June 7. <www.fdicig.gov/reports00/00-022.pdf>
(December 2, 2005).
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1999.
Preliminary views on major issues related to reporting
financial instruments and certain related assets and
liabilities at fair value. Financial Accounting Series
No. 204-B, December 14. <www.fasb.org/draft/pvfvalu1.
pdf> (December 2, 2005).
Frame, Scott W. 2003. Federal Home Loan Bank mort-
gage purchases: Implications for mortgage markets.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review
88, no. 3:17–31.
Wall, Larry D., and Timothy W. Koch. 2000. Bank loan-
loss accounting: A review of theoretical and empirical
evidence. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic
Review 85, no. 2:1–19.
Walter, John R. 1991. Loan loss reserves. Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 77,
no. 4:20–30.
REFERENCES